Turkey’s geographic and geostrategic position, along with its membership in NATO, has given it a valuable opportunity to leverage in the Syrian file, as it seeks to expand the safe zone along the border with Syria and resettle one million of the 3.7 million Syrian refugees there. The aim is to boost the popularity of the Justice and Development Party in the face of domestic opposition to the Syrian presence in Turkey, and to distract the public from worsening economic and living conditions by achieving a military and political gain tied to Turkish national security.
Erdoğan announced the new military operation, and the Turkish National Security Council approved it; he is now waiting for green lights from the United States and Russia.
U.S. opposition to any new Turkish move east of the Euphrates was clear and explicit, prompting the Turkish president to turn his attention toward Manbij and Tel Rifaat west of the Euphrates, while reminding both Moscow and Washington that they had failed to honor their commitments to move the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) elements, and the SDF 30 kilometers away from the border after the halting of Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring, in accordance with the memorandums of understanding signed by each of them with Ankara on October 17 and 22, 2019.
Ankara is also pressuring Washington by reminding it of its commitments under the 2018 Manbij road map, which included clearing Manbij and its surroundings of Autonomous Administration elements, forming a local council, and conducting joint U.S.-Turkish patrols.
There is also U.S. opposition to a Turkish military operation in Manbij, or even in the vicinity of Ain al-Arab (Kobani); Washington does not want Turkey to control contiguous areas in the north or to gain a larger role in Syria.
Ankara also fears that, if it launches an attack on Manbij, the U.S. Congress may demand the reinstatement of economic sanctions on Turkey, which were imposed after Operation Peace Spring in 2019 and recently frozen by Washington as a gesture aimed at opening a more positive phase in relations with Ankara, given the role it could play in mediation with Russia.
There are also U.S.-Turkish arrangements concerning Turkey’s purchase of 40 F-16 fighter jets, the modernization of its older aircraft, and negotiations over the possibility of rejoining the F-35 program. Turkey also wants to pressure Washington and NATO members to curb the activities of PKK elements and the Gulen movement.
This means that the Turkish threat of a military operation may stop at Tel Rifaat, which is controlled by the People’s Protection Units (YPG) amid Russian, Iranian, and Syrian influence.
It is true that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed understanding for Turkey’s security concerns during his brief visit to Turkey last Wednesday; however, he also reminded his Turkish counterpart, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, that Turkey had failed to implement the 2020 Sochi agreement between the two sides, especially with regard to confining hardline factions to a small pocket on the Turkish border, conducting joint patrols, and opening the international M4 highway.
Lavrov postponed discussion of the issue until the Astana 18 meeting next week; this suggests that the Russians are considering a return to a trade-off involving Tel Rifaat in exchange for the area south of the international highway, namely Jabal al-Zawiya.
Moscow wants to exploit the Turkish escalation by seeking to enable the regime and border guards to control a buffer zone, and it shares Washington’s desire to limit Turkish influence in Syria.
But Russia needs Turkey in the Ukraine file, specifically regarding Ankara’s opposition to the bids by Sweden and Finland to join NATO at the alliance’s expected meeting at the end of the month in Madrid. Ankara has also not committed to implementing Western economic sanctions on Moscow, limiting itself instead to restricting Russian military naval and air traffic through its territory.
Moscow also wants Ankara to play the role of mediator in the Ukraine file with the government in Kyiv, the West, and Washington. During Lavrov’s recent visit to Turkey, and before that in a phone call between the defense ministers, Sergei Shoigu and Hulusi Akar, the two sides discussed opening a safe shipping corridor for Ukrainian agricultural products, especially wheat, corn, and sunflower oil, with Turkish participation and a Turkish security guarantee from the port of Odesa through the Black Sea to the Bosphorus Strait.
In return, Ankara asked Kyiv for a 25 percent discount on its imports of Ukrainian grain, amounting to 20 million tons, while Moscow wants Ankara to mediate in reducing restrictions on Russian banking and financial transactions with the outside world related to its agricultural exports of grain and fertilizers.
Russia, for its part, rejects any new Turkish incursion east of the Euphrates. It wants to retain its positions there and ensure that its influence in Syria is not affected by its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, especially amid reports of a renewed U.S. presence at the Kharab Ishk base near Ain al-Arab/Kobani.
This prompted Moscow and the Damascus government to send reinforcements to SDF forces near Manbij and Tel Rifaat, and east of the Euphrates in Ain Issa, as well as along the entire contact line with the factions of the National Army and the rest of the Syrian-Turkish border, while conducting joint patrols with the SDF and the regime. Russia also reinforced its forces at the strategically important al-Mabaqir base in the Tel Tamr countryside, northwest of al-Hasakah, because it serves as a separation zone between SDF forces and National Army factions in the Operation Peace Spring area, and because it contains a strategic road junction, including the intersection of the international M4 highway with routes leading to the road that runs parallel to the Syrian-Turkish border and extends toward the Iraqi border, as part of Moscow’s strategy to control Syria’s main road and transport networks.
Despite Washington’s desire to unsettle Moscow in Syria, the two sides agree on limiting Turkish gains in Syria and reducing them to negotiations over Tel Rifaat and its surroundings. Russia does not want to open a new battlefront between Turkey and the factions loyal to it on one side, and the regime and the Iranian militias backing it on the other. Likewise, Turkey’s deteriorating economic situation, along with the declining popularity of the Justice and Development Party, makes it difficult for Ankara to risk a broad military operation opposed by both Russia and the United States. This means that the Turkish escalation will likely be limited to propaganda, speeches, pressure tactics, and perhaps limited skirmishes, until an agreement is reached with the Russians—perhaps at the upcoming Astana meeting—on a trade-off short of fighting, or on deferring the issue until further notice.
