Southern Syria is entering a new phase in the struggle for influence as Iranian militias move to reinforce their presence once again, taking advantage of Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine and its greatly reduced presence. Iran has exploited these circumstances to its benefit, given the south’s strategic value.
The Iranian presence in southern Syria is not new, nor has it ceased in recent years. Rather, it has mostly been concealed within the structures of the regime’s army and security services. Iran benefits from the deep experience it has built up in southern Syria, including its physical and demographic geography, as well as extensive knowledge of local economic and living conditions.
Iran may not have achieved major success in spreading Shiism in southern Syria, where it faced social resistance because local communities felt this posed a threat to their identity—an issue that cannot be taken lightly or allowed to become a matter for bargaining.
But it is certain that it has built networks of mutually beneficial, interest-based relationships suited to the tribal nature of the population, linking them to Iran and its policies in the south. It has been aided in this by its strong ties with the security services, which maintain constantly updated archives of information on the population.
But Iran is not content merely with trying to control southern Syria in order to subject it to Assad’s rule. Rather, it seeks to turn it into a launchpad for influencing neighboring areas—Israel and Jordan—in order to strengthen its leverage as an influential and effective regional power at a time of major international shifts, and amid its confrontation with Western powers over its nuclear file, which appears headed into a period of deep dormancy as Washington loses interest in concluding a deal with Tehran under current international conditions.
What is new is that Jordan and Israel have significantly changed their approach to the Iranian presence in southern Syria and have become ready to take firmer measures in dealing with the threat it poses. In an earlier period, opposition factions had largely confronted the Iranian presence and confined it to limited geographic areas, in the Death Triangle and some villages of Jabal al-Sheikh. Even in Sweida, this presence was not highly visible.
But matters changed in favor of Iran and its militias after the Assad regime regained control and dismantled the structures of the opposition factions. Not only did resistance to Iran come to an end, but many members of the “settlement” groups were drawn into the ranks of its militias or into military and security bodies affiliated with Iran. Russia’s opportunism, and its need for Iran’s militias as a ground force and a source of cheap manpower to expand Russian influence in Syria, gave Iran an opening it used to preserve and continually strengthen its influence in southern Syria.
In Jordan, there is a firm conviction within the political establishment that drugs, although they are a means of generating financial profit, are also an Iranian tool for destroying Jordanian and Gulf society. They can be used to subjugate the Jordanian state without firing a single shot in service of the Iranian project, by creating power centers made up of the kingpins running the Iranian drug trade, strengthening and propping them up so they can control key sectors of the Jordanian economy, and inserting them into Jordan’s political structure through parliament, unions, and parties. It may take no more than a decade to implement this plan and place Jordan in Iran’s grip.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to create a long-term security dilemma for Israel by establishing Iranian cells all along the border with the Golan, stretching from the southern Damascus countryside to the last village in southern Daraa. These areas resemble the Golan Heights in terms of rugged terrain and the many valleys that make it easy to hide weapons and fighters, and this is what Iran is focusing on at present.
What measures have Jordan and Israel taken to confront the Iranian scheme? Jordan has changed the rules of engagement by ordering the army to engage suspected targets with live fire, and as a result many smugglers have been killed. But it is certain that Iran will work to adapt to this change and use new plans to achieve its goals, as it is known to operate on more than one level: penetrating the security services, infiltrating Jordanian local communities, and using modern smuggling techniques. This situation leaves Jordan constantly drained without achieving significant results in combating the Iranian project.
For its part, Israel relies on direct strikes when it has information about Iranian movements in southern Syria, and uses technical surveillance methods in addition to informants on the Syrian side. It has achieved many results, but it does not appear to have fully eliminated the Iranian threat.
Jordan and Israel face a number of obstacles in confronting the Iranian project:
The weakness of their tools for countering the Iranian project, as they have no support base in southern Syria on which they can rely after the dismantling of the armed factions. As for their military measures, Iran appears capable of adapting to them.
Iran’s lack of sensitivity to its human losses, since it is known that Iranian militias are mostly made up of non-Iranian fighters: Afghans, Pakistanis, Iraqis, and Syrians.
The integration of Iran’s geopolitical projects into the ideological framework of the Iranian state, which explains its tirelessness in pursuing its project despite the difficulties and obstacles it faces.
Despite the economic troubles Iran faces, it is capable of providing substantial funding to support its project, something not available to Jordan and Israel.
Based on these facts, how can Iran’s project in southern Syria be confronted? It seems that Jordan and Israel face limited options: either they move to occupy a border strip in the south that would give them room to maneuver and push Iran’s militias back, or they bring down the Assad regime to rid themselves of this chronic problem. Both options carry costs and risks, and implementing them may require international cover from Washington.
It is unlikely that conditions will improve under Iranian control. Rather, what is expected is a growing intensity of chaos and its repercussions for local communities in the south—something Iran wants, so that it can entrench its influence without the slightest resistance.
